

**TAJIKISTAN:**  
**RESULTS REVIEW AND RESOURCE REQUEST (R4)**

**USAID Regional Mission for Central Asia**  
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## **I. Overview and Factors Affecting Program Performance**

Compared to the previous year, the development context in Tajikistan has changed significantly in recent months. Specifically, increased violence in the capital city and surrounding areas may herald the beginning of a reduced USAID/CAR presence in Tajikistan. However, events are still so new that a final decision has not yet been reached. Despite this tense situation, many development elements remain unchanged in Tajikistan. The country is the poorest of the five Central Asian Republics and the only one of the five in which underlying ethnic, regional, economic and ideological strains have led to open warfare and major population displacements. A cease-fire has continued to be in partial effect since late 1993, and UN-moderated peace talks appeared to be making incremental progress in establishing a political consensus until the recent outbreak of violence. The UN Mission of Military Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) monitors the cease-fire agreement, while Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Russian-led troops, at the request of the local government, guard the southern Tajikistan boundary and monitor the ceasefire.

Donor efforts, including USAID/CAR interventions, continue to make a difference in Tajikistan's situation. For example, the economy, in free fall since independence, achieved a measure of economic stability last year. Specific U.S. interests include provision of humanitarian aid, helping to establish a framework for sustainable economic growth, promoting regional stability in Central Asia, and promoting an independent, democratic and market-oriented Tajikistan that is friendly to the U.S. and constructively engaged in international political and economic relationships. To better achieve these results, the Mission is formalizing its approach with this complete R4 for Tajikistan. It lays the foundation for the movement away from short-term humanitarian relief to post-conflict stabilization and more long-term sustainable development.

## **II. Progress Toward Achieving Strategic Objectives**

Per guidance received from Washington, this section provides performance assessments on the Mission's strategic objectives in Tajikistan. The specific objectives addressed are as follows:

- SO 1.3            Accelerated development and growth of private enterprises
- SO 1.4            More competitive and responsible private financial sector
- SO 2.1            Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making
- SO 3.1            Reduced human suffering and crisis impact

In addition to the above, region-wide strategic frameworks were developed for energy and the environment.

SO 1.5            More economically sound and environmentally sustainable energy system as the primary engine of economic growth for Central Asia

SO 3.3            Reduction in regional economic and political tensions generated by transboundary environmental issues.

Other activities in Tajikistan include the use of health earmarks for medical partnerships, and training in family planning and clinical management. While worthwhile endeavors, these items are not part of the Mission's core program. Hence, in conformity with R4 guidance, they are respectively evaluated through one or more indicators and corresponding targets, under the follow Special Objective:

SO 4.1            Special Initiatives

Similarly, Eurasia Foundation activities are not an integral part of our core program. Hence, their activities are now grouped under:

SO 4.1            Cross-Cutting Programs

Since the Eurasia Foundation does not report to the Mission, we have not provided an indicator or target to describe their activities.

Finally, significant resources are devoted to training in the United States, third countries, and the Central Asian region. The purpose of this effort is to reinforce USAID/CAR technical assistance through exposure of key officials and private sector individuals to positive reform experiences in other countries. The cross-cutting nature of this program under SO 4.2 and the fact that its impact is measured in other strategic objectives means that a formal R4 framework is not required.

## **SO1.3 ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE**

### **A. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE**

Depending on funding availability and the improvement of the domestic situation, USAID is contemplating the provision of technical assistance to improve the commercial and investment environment in Tajikistan, possibly in FY 97, but more probably in FY 98. To this point, no targets have been established.

### **B. PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVE**

#### **1. Performance Analysis**

Qualified by the statements in Part I, USAID is contemplating a future commercial law development program in Tajikistan to improve the business and investment environment and protect the rights of the private sector. At this point, the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) represents the current major USG initiative aimed at promoting a private commercial sector in Tajikistan. In 1996, approximately \$600,000 in equity investments and loan funding have been approved by CAAEF. In addition, IESC has worked in conjunction with CAAEF to prepare business plans and technical assistance for potential CAAEF partners.

**Progress rating: N/A**

#### **2. Expected Progress Through FY 99 and Management Actions**

At this extremely early stage, it is difficult to gauge the progress for this Strategic Objective until the political situation stabilizes, Tajikistan's attitude and commitment to the reforms are clarified, and also whether a funding commitment will be provided by USAID. A positive result could lead to expanded technical assistance in the areas of trade and investment and commercial law reform, which would continue probably up to and beyond FY 99; a reactionary response could result in either the non-start of the project or a later discontinuation of the entire effort. It is expected that CAAEF and IESC activity will continue through FY 99.

### 3. Performance Data Tables

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE : 1.3.3</b> <b>APPROVED:</b> 7/12/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan/USAID			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Increased availability of and access to capital and technological resources for the private sector			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Loans and joint venture funds invested			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Dollars (million)	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1996	-	.6
	1997	3	
	1998	5	
	1999	7	
	2000	9	
	2001	11	
<b>SOURCE:</b> Contractor and grantee' reports			
<b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Dollar volume of joint venture funds invested and loans provided			
<b>COMMENTS:</b>			

## **SO 1.4 A MORE COMPETITIVE AND MARKET-RESPONSIVE PRIVATE FINANCIAL SECTOR**

### **A. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE**

Technical assistance has just recently begun in Tajikistan in this area. No data are yet available for this indicator.

### **B. PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVE**

#### **1. Performance Analysis**

**SO performance indicator 1. Bank deposits as a percentage of GDP.** The indicator definition is private sector deposits in Kazakhstan's banking system as a percentage of GDP. Technical Assistance has just recently begun in Tajikistan in this area. No data are yet available for this indicator.

A competitive, private financial sector is vital to the growth of a market-oriented economy. Hence, new market-based financial institutions are urgently needed to replace Soviet relics that are incapable of serving a modern economy in Tajikistan. Given such conditions, in 1997 and beyond this strategic objective seeks to build a legal/regulatory structure to provide the foundation for private sector banks. Preliminary work began in January 1997 to provide an initial estimate of the status of commercial banking in Tajikistan and its regulation.

A USAID-funded short-term advisor has begun to assess both the universe of commercial banks in Tajikistan and the supervisory capability of the National Bank of Tajikistan (Central Bank).

The success of this SO is highly dependent on the Government of Tajikistan's overall economic restructuring program, which is being developed in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank.

**Progress rating: TBD**

**IR 1.4.1.2. Regulatory framework and reporting systems are broadly applied to effectively screen out deficient institutions.** Technical assistance has just recently begun in Tajikistan in this area. No data are yet available for this indicator.

**Progress rating: TBD**

#### **2. Expected Progress through 1999 and Management Actions:**

By 2001 USAID needs to help achieve one primary result in this strategic objective in Tajikistan. This result is that sets of institutions, services, and financial instruments are created and properly protect "customers" rights. In other words, private-sector banks are established and provide essential financial services to business and population, namely:

- . Electronic fund transfers system among banks and for the business community.
- . Market-based bank and securities credit.
- . Deposit and checking accounts, primarily for business.

With scarce resources, this effort will be focused on a limited number of banks on a pilot basis and on the supervision department of the Central Bank.



### 3. Performance Data Tables

<b>Strategic Objective 1.4:</b> A More Competitive and Market Responsive Private Financial Sector <b>APPROVED:</b> 07/12/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Tajikistan			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> A more competitive and market responsive private financial sector			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Bank deposits as % of GDP			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> percent <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> NBK <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Private sector deposits in Tajikistan's banking system as % of GDP <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> Technical assistance has just recently begun in Tajikistan in this area. No data are yet available for this indicator.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1996	0.08	
	1997	0.2	
	1998	0.5	
	1999	1.0	
	2000	2.0	
	2001	4.0	

<b>Strategic Objective 1.4:</b> A More Competitive and Market Responsive Private Financial Sector <b>APPROVED:</b> 07/12/1996 <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> USAID/Tajikistan			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> Regulatory framework and reporting systems are broadly applied effectively screen out deficient institutions			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> increasing % of banks meeting capital adequacy requirements			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> percent <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> NBK <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Percentage of all banks that meet capital adequacy requirements <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> Technical assistance has just recently begun in Tajikistan in this area. No data are yet available for this indicator.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1996	0	
	1997	10	
	1998	25	
	1999	50	
	2000	75	
	2001	90	

## **SO 2.1 INCREASED BETTER INFORMED CITIZENS PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING**

### **A. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE**

The strategy for improving citizen participation in economic and political decision making in Tajikistan combines two simultaneous areas of development: strengthening non government organizations (NGOs) and increasing the availability of information. In 1997, activities to test the efficacy of working with the Judiciary are being developed. No major initiatives with the government will be undertaken without further assessment.

The underlying rationale for a two part approach in Tajikistan is that the government will give NGOs and independent electronic media the opportunity for development due either to its inability to govern, or due to its preoccupation with civil disturbances. Without USAID assistance, NGOs and the independent media lack the technical skills and financial resources necessary to develop into sustainable organizations. Increased availability of information also includes work with the legal information center in Dushanbe to serve as a repository for legislation and draft laws.

Providing development assistance in Tajikistan is difficult due to the civil disturbances, and it is no less so for Civil Society programs. USAID grantee expatriate staff have recently returned to Dushanbe after a recommended evacuation. Another difficulty of working in Tajikistan that the peace talks are expected to result in a government which is made up possibly of 50 percent opposition members. USAID is therefore waiting for installation of the new government, before attempting to engage the government in civil society activities. Limited engagement on this SO is essential to the overall efforts aimed at stabilization of the political situation.

A variety of opportunities and needs will open up when, and if, the parties agree to national reconciliation. USAID/CAR hopes resources will be available to respond to and encourage the peace process.

### **B. PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVE**

#### **1. Performance Analysis**

The development of civil society in Tajikistan has had both high and low points this year. The high point this year was that following a seminar on independent media law, the government passed a new media law, with input from the independent television station directors, that should promote independent media in Tajikistan.

**IR 2.1.1 Citizen Participation in NGOs.** USAID has engaged with Tajik counterparts on civil society issues through a combination of U.S. training, in-country training, and modest technical assistance. Results have been encouraging. For example, a legal information center was established in Dushanbe and is now operating without USAID assistance. Local NGOs have participated in a number of conferences and training sessions aimed at enhancing their role and effectiveness in Tajikistan.

The NGO capacity building center in Dushanbe has trained over 267 NGO members and 220 local NGOs received training over the past year, and awarded \$83,206 in grants in 1996. Projects developed using USAID's funds included a variety of social services to help victims of the civil war, and also those who are trying to create a new society. In total the data base for Tajikistan contains 50 advocacy NGOs. The project is managed from Tajikistan to maximize small grant oversight and NGO development. Even during the evacuation of American personnel from Dushanbe, trainings and technical assistance continued in other regions of the country.

**Progress Rating: Fair**

**IR 2.1.2 Information on domestic economic policies and politics available.** This IR formerly focused only on independent electronic media. It will include a law library and NGO newsletters.

**Progress Rating: Medium**

**IR 2.1.3 Increased responsiveness and accountability of Government to citizens and citizen organizations.** This indicator has changed from a focus on the parliament. Activities in this new area will have to wait for installation of the new government. No significant changes have taken place that would require changes on the objective level.

Tajikistan will continue to present a challenge to democratic transition both until the peace process is concluded, and after. The reasons include safety, the potential new government and an economy which is almost prohibitive of self-sustainability. However, USAID intends to tackle these issues in the coming years.

**Progress Rating: No activity**

## **2. Expected progress through FY99 and Management actions**

Efforts to bring about political consensus in Tajikistan have proven to be both long and arduous. Nonetheless, opportunities do exist to promote reconciliation, enhance information flows, and increase the participation of Tajik citizens in the economic and political life of the country. Indeed, the civil war and the economic decline have in a number of instances left vacuums that can be filled in part by local community groups working together to achieve common goals. Similarly, the presence of a large number of US and other international private voluntary organizations (PVOs) provide a graphic and often impressive demonstration of the importance of non-government organizations (NGOs) in any society.

Progress will depend on the security situation in the country, the economic improvement allowing people to focus on participation rather than existence, and on progress in the peace talks on national reconciliation which may bring a new government. Taking that into consideration, USAID expects all independent television stations in Tajikistan to register and become legal this year. The NGO sector should grow, as the government remains unable to provide services to the people.

The modest NGO and media support activities of the past will likely continue in Tajikistan. Examples and "lessons learned" from other countries in Central Asia and other war torn countries will be brought to bear on the Tajikistan experience. If a political breakthrough is achieved and the ongoing peace talks involving the various Tajik political factions are successfully concluded, additional opportunities for work in the democratization and civil society arenas may also emerge.

If a new government is installed, USAID will explore ways to work with it to improve accountability and responsiveness. The only change in strategy right now is the renewed interest in the legal information center as a repository for draft legislation, and, as part of the aforementioned on-going effort to test the efficacy of working with the Judiciary, the possibility of publishing draft legislation through the Supreme Economic Court. Depending upon the outcomes of talks, USAID may also begin partnership relationships between USPVOs and indigenous NGOs in key sectors like agriculture and business associations to increase the voice of NGOs in economic decision making.

The difficulties in Dushanbe and other parts of the country made for slow progress all year. If the parties to the conflict can successfully conclude the peace talks, USAID may see great advancement in its work, but no graduation process is expected at this time.

### 3. Performance Data Tables

<b>OBJECTIVE: 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making</b> <b>APPROVED: NA</b> <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Tajikistan; USAID/CAR</b>			
<b>RESULT NAME: IR 2.1.1.2</b> Improved Laws and Policies enabling Right of Assembly and Association			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Improved Laws and/or policies enabling the Right of Assembly and Association			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Total Actual registration points and total possible indicators of registration out of 11 total possible points 1 point = Constitution allows citizen group formation 1 point = NGOs of non-political nature, who are very persistent can be registered 1 point = Groups with board of directors/memberships from all states necessary for national group - provision eliminated 1 point = Groups can be registered with as few as five members 1 point = NGOs with a political agenda can register to operate 1 point = NGOs need only register for tax purposes, and registration is not a barrier to operations 1 point = Law differentiates between businesses and public associations 1 point = Law allows public service groups to be exempted from income tax on contributions and dues 1 point = Law allows donations by individuals to be deducted against personal income tax liability 1 point = Law allows for donations by corporations to be deducted against corporate income tax liability 1 point = Law allows for preferential treatment by tax authorities on revenue generation through micro/business operations for organizations solely to support the charitable activities of the NGO	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995	-	1 of 11
	1996	1 of 11	1 of 11
	1997	1 of 11	
	1998	3 of 11	
	1999	3 of 11	
	2000	3 of 11	
<b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> The quality of the law shall be determined by how many points out of a possible 11 the law contains.	2001	3 of 11	
<b>COMMENTS:</b> Tajik NGOs have participated in regional technical assistance activities			

<b>OBJECTIVE: 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making</b> <b>APPROVED: NA</b> <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION: Tajikistan ; USAID/CAR</b>			
<b>RESULT NAME: IR 2.1.2.2</b> Domestic news widely available via electronic media			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Number of independent TV and radio stations			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Number of independent TV/radio stations, each station counting as one.  <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> Internews survey  <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> An independent station is one which operates without government subsidy.  <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b>  At the end of calendar year 1996 Tajikistan made it legal for the first time since Independence for media to operate independent of state control.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995	-	
	1996	-	7/2
	1997	9/2	
	1998	11/3	
	1999	13/4	
	2000	14/5	
	2001	14/5	

<b>OBJECTIVE: 2.1 Increased, better-informed citizens' participation in political and economic decision-making</b> <b>APPROVED:</b> NA <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan; USAID/CAR			
<b>RESULT NAME: IR 2.1.3.1</b> Increased Government Transparency			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Number of consultative processes addressing legislative or policy issues			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Number for which USAID has a record of time, place and issue under discussion  <hr/> <b>SOURCE:</b> American Bar Association; Counterpart  <hr/> <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> A consultative process shall be considered to be a meeting between a member of government and the public, as recorded (date and topic) by a USAID implementing partner for the purpose of providing citizen input into developing policy.  <hr/> <b>COMMENTS:</b> Until the reconciled government is in place, USAID will be directing very little programming to working with the government.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1995	-	-
	1996	-	1 Media Law
	1997	2	
	1998		
	1999		
	2000		
	2001		





## **SO 3.1 REDUCED SUFFERING AND CRISIS IMPACT**

### **A. OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE**

Tajikistan is the only one of the five Central Asian Republics in which USAID is supporting activities to achieve Mission Strategic Objective 3.1 (Reduced Human Suffering and Crisis Impact). UNHCR, USAID, and other international donors have been largely successful in dealing with the aftermath of the 1992 civil war, which resulted in many deaths, and the destruction of many thousands of homes, schools, health centers, and other facilities.

USAID activities under this strategic objective have been carried out through contributions to international organizations and United States Private and Voluntary Organizations (U.S. PVO's). U.S. PVO's are USAID's main partners and implementing agencies in Tajikistan. USAID-funded PVO's will remain a significant programming vehicle. They were an effective means for delivering humanitarian assistance in the period immediately following the civil war. They remain effective in the implementation of development-oriented programs in place of purely humanitarian assistance programs.

Events in late 1996 and early 1997 in Tajikistan have reinforced the view that the situation is fragile. Programming needs to remain flexible in order to be able to respond quickly and substantively to the changing economic and political scene.

### **B. PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVES**

#### **1. Performance Analysis**

The time frame for achieving strategic objective 3.1 is established at seven years, to end in FY 2000. Two indicators were selected: number of development programs, and policies introduced which ultimately will show that human suffering has been reduced.

**Progress Rating: progress is delayed (see below)**

In support of peace keeping/conciliation efforts, USAID has provided a grant to the United Nations Military Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). Results of this effort are not clear at this point. U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO's) are the main vehicle for implementing activities to achieve IR 3.1.2 (shift from relief to development strategy strengthened). The 1996 program reflected this shift - 5 PVOs were awarded grants to support programs designed to impact the household income level; improved health care status; and strengthening of small businesses at the village level. Delays in awarding the grants coupled with the current strife have affected progress of SA 3.1. No data exist currently to show progress by the PVOs for the 1996 program. Data from the 1995/96 program shows that 500,000 people were provided with food; 40,000 people gained access to potable water in various projects sites; 260,000 people had better access to health care services and; 62,000 people were provided shelter.

### **3. Expected Progress Through FY 1999 and Management Actions**

The fragility of the current situation is recognized. The work of the U.S. PVOs and, thus, progress toward achieving this Strategic Objective is dependent on a relatively stable security situation. USAID is reassessing mechanisms to best support achievement of this strategic objective. Under consideration is a) continued support to U.S. PVOs under current assistance instruments; b) strong collaboration with the World Bank in selectively supporting components of the newly formed Tajikistan Social Investment Fund (TASIF); c) support of UNDP activities in "Strengthening the Continuum from Aid to Technical Assistance;" or d) combinations of these mechanisms. These mechanisms need further consideration and discussion with Embassy Dushanbe and with Washington before committing to a definitive path. USAID looks forward to discussing during Program Week the merits of various approaches toward achieving "reduced human suffering and crisis impact" in Tajikistan in the shortest timeframe.

### 3. Performance Data Tables

<b>OBJECTIVE:</b> Reduced Human Suffering and Impact of Crisis <b>APPROVED:</b> <b>COUNTRY/ORGANIZATION:</b> Tajikistan, USAID/CAR			
<b>RESULT NAME:</b> IR 3.1 Development oriented interventions to reduce human suffering and crisis impact demonstrated			
<b>INDICATOR:</b> Percent of USAID grants directed towards development			
<b>UNIT OF MEASURE:</b> Percent  <b>SOURCE:</b> USAID records  <b>INDICATOR DESCRIPTION:</b> Dollar volume of USAID assistance with development component as a percent of total grants by USAID in Tajikistan  <b>COMMENTS:</b>  This is an input indicator, rather than a measurement of results. It reflects the changing nature of the situation in Tajikistan. USAID/CAR does not have necessary and sufficient resources to achieve a strategic objective. However, strategic and political concerns require USAID to remain engaged in this effort, in order to move the development agenda to the forefront.	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>PLANNED</b>	<b>ACTUAL</b>
	1993	NA	0
	1994	NA	0
	1995	NA	0
	1996	95%	
	1997	95%	
	1998	100%	
	1999	complete	

## **SO 4.1 SPECIAL INITIATIVES**

### **Reproductive Health**

The Reproductive Health Services Expansion Program (RHSEP) was initiated in 1994 in Tajikistan. The purpose of the program was to promote the use of safe, modern contraceptives in order to decrease the dependence on abortions to control fertility. There were three USAID Cooperating Agencies (CAs) implementing the program in Tajikistan: the Johns Hopkins Program for international Education in Obstetrics and Gynecology (JHPIEGO); Access to Voluntary Safe Contraception (AVSC); and The Futures Group through its OPTIONS project.

Under the RHSEP the Ministry of Health adopted and disseminated the Pocket Guide for Family Planning Service Providers to serve as a national resource document on reproductive health and family planning. An updated family planning curriculum is being incorporated into the refresher training curriculum of the Tajik Scientific Research Center for Obstetricians, Gynecologists, and Pediatrics in Dushanbe. Service providers have been trained in Khojand. There are physicians in Dushanbe and Khojand who have been trained in minilaparotomy.

Statistics regarding the contraceptive use or the general abortion rate have not been collected from the Ministry of Health due to the current civil disturbances. The only data that is available is data collected by OPTIONS in 1993 which reported a Contraceptive Prevalence Rate of 3 percent and an estimated abortions per woman (Total Abortion Rate) of 1.1-1.4.

### **Medical Partnerships**

The AIHA medical partnership in Tajikistan is between the cities of Dushanbe, Tajikistan and Boulder, Colorado. The partnership was established in August 1995 and will enter its graduation phase in August 1998. The graduation phase will continue for two years until August 2000, subject to the availability of funding.

Reforming the role of nurses is an important component of the partnership's efforts. A nursing conference was held for 250 nurses from all over Tajikistan. The conference focused on increasing the skill level and professionalism of nurses. Partnership personnel have also been trained in prevention and treatment of dehydration in infants and children, clinical management of diabetes in pregnancy, endocrinology, and dental care.

### **Infectious Disease Program**

USAID's work in infectious disease, specifically vaccine preventable diseases, in Tajikistan started in 1992 under the REACH Project. The Project provided technical assistance for emergency relief concerning vaccine supplies, cold chain equipment, and introduction of the new immunization schedule consistent with World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations.

The REACH Project ended in 1994 and was followed by the Basic Support for Institutionalizing Child Survival (BASICS) Project in 1995. BASICS continued the EPI (Expanded Program of Immunization) activities initiated under REACH. With BASICS technical assistance and training a new immunization schedule which is consistent with the WHO recommendations and drastically reduces the number of contraindications was introduced to Tajikistan. It helped to create the Republican Center of Immunoprophylaxis in July 1996, including pediatricians and epidemiologists. With BASICS technical assistance both rounds of Operation MECACAR (to eradicate polio by the year 2000) achieved greater than 95 percent coverage for polio vaccine. According to the WHO, the transmission of wild polio virus in Tajikistan has been interrupted: no cases of poliomyelitis have been detected since May 1995. According to the WHO Communicable Disease Report of February 1997, the reported diphtheria cases in Tajikistan decreased by 67 percent from 4455 cases in 1995 to 1464 cases in 1996.

Three sets of manuals have been developed over the past year in response to priorities and felt needs of MOH/Tajikistan, as well as counterparts in other republics. They are: 1) *Vaccine Finance & Procurement*; 2) a *Handbook for Health Communications*; and (3) a *Vaccine Cold Chain and Logistics Manual*, developed specifically for immunization managers in the NIS.

The Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) between USAID and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was initiated in 1994 to strengthen and improve the surveillance systems and to produce and disseminate regularly published public health bulletins.

CDC completed a thorough analysis of the infectious disease surveillance system providing recommendations to the Ministry of Health on possible improvements that would streamline and strengthen the current system. CDC provided Russian-language versions and trained all oblast-level Sanitary Epidemiologic Station (SES) epidemiologists in the use of Epi-Info and Epi-Map software to facilitate the use of case-based surveillance to assist their efforts in control of infectious diseases, especially diphtheria and polio, two "high-priority" diseases.

Tajikistan has experienced several Typhoid Epidemics the past years due to the breakdown of water supply and sewage systems. A Typhoid Epidemic started in Dushanbe in early 1997. Approximately 3,500 cases have been reported by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Tajikistan Sub Delegation on February 20, 1997. The typhoid epidemic has spread outside Dushanbe with reports of over 2,000 cases throughout southern Tajikistan. Responding to the request from the Tajikistan Ministry of Health and the American Ambassador in Tajikistan for assistance in dealing with the current typhoid outbreak in Tajikistan, CDC has sent four experts in food borne and diarrheal diseases. The team has brought laboratory materials to set up antimicrobial resistance surveillance.

### III. Status of the Management Contract

The Management Contract agreed to by the Mission and Washington during last spring's R4 has not been significantly altered for Tajikistan. However, it is important to note the following for use in this year's R4 discussions:

**A. Strategic Objective Changes or Refinements:** Last year the Mission was not required to submit a full R4 for Tajikistan. This year's submission, however, contains a complete framework for several strategic objectives. The Mission's regional strategic objectives also have activities in Tajikistan, as described in the Regional R4 for Central Asia. In this connection, the Mission has changed the focus of the Regional Energy Strategic Objective 1.5 to more fully reflect the role that energy will play in the economic development of Central Asia. Also, the Mission has revised the R4 for the Regional Environmental Strategic Objective 3.3, which has activities in Tajikistan. In contrast to last year, the new wording for this objective focuses on transboundary issues rather than just improved air, water, and waste management practices.

**B. Partnership For Freedom:** The Mission sponsors one active partnership in health in Tajikistan. In the future, we will seek other opportunities to use partnerships in Tajikistan when and where appropriate as an effective tool to amplify the impact of our ongoing programs. A particular fertile area would be in the social sector where partnerships with local communities and NGOs would allow programs to be sustainable when donor assistance ends.

**C. Phase-Out Dates:** USAID/CAR presented its framework for transition in the CAR countries in a cable sent to Washington in September 1996. In this document, the Mission argued that the entire CAR region should continue to be funded under the FSA (or other funds set aside for the former Soviet Union) for as long as possible. The Mission also argued that the end of FSA funding should not herald the end of an official USG technical cooperation presence. In addition, the Mission stated that phase-out should occur on a regional basis so as not to send the wrong political signal to the affected countries. Finally, the Mission noted that the current program in Central Asia fits well in the DA menu of activities and that a shift to DA funding at some later date would not entail any dramatic changes in ongoing activities. These issues will need to be further discussed in Washington during the formal R4 review process, particularly as they relate to Tajikistan which is the poorest and least developed of the Central Asian republics.

**D. Appropriateness of Tajikistan Strategy.** In light of recent events in Tajikistan, the Mission is currently analyzing program directions to determine the effect that conflict may have on our ability to achieve our objectives. If the current disturbances continue to worsen and extend into other parts of the country, including the capital, it may be advisable to reduce our technical assistance and to continue focusing on humanitarian interventions and control of immediate crises, e.g. typhoid, cholera, etc. However, if conditions improve, a sound basis exists for focusing the program on the strategic objectives outlined in this R4. In this latter case, the Mission hopes to focus more on post-conflict stabilization and long-term sustainable

development. In either scenario, Tajikistan is likely to need foreign assistance for relief needs for the foreseeable future.

**E. Environmental Compliance:** At the current stage of development of Tajikistan, environmental issues requiring IEEs and EAs rarely emerge. USAID/CAR is not contemplating initiating any programs in FY 1998 that would require any environmental impact assessments for Tajikistan.



#### **IV. Resource Requirements**

Sent in a separate e-mail.